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FORCED BUSINESS CLOSURES 
Executive Orders by the Governor Closing Private Businesses 
CODE SECTIONS: O.C.G.A. §§ 38-3-3, -51 
EXECUTIVE ORDERS: Ga. Exec. Order Nos. 03.14.20.01; 
03.16.20.01; 03.23.20.01; 03.26.20.02; 
04.01.20.01; 04.02.20.01; 04.08.20.04; 
04.23.20.02; 04.27.20.01; 05.12.20.02; 
05.21.20.01; 05.28.20.02; 06.11.20.01 
EFFECTIVE DATES: March 14, 2020; March 16, 2020; 
March 23, 2020; March 26, 2020; April 
1, 2020; April 2, 2020; April 3, 2020; 
April 8, 2020; April 23, 2020; April 27, 
2020; April 30, 2020; May 15, 2020; 
May 21, 2020; May 28, 2020; June 11, 
2020 
SUMMARY: Governor Brian Kemp (R) issued 
Executive Orders in response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic that required 
businesses to close in an effort to limit 
the spread of the virus. Business 
owners often challenged those forced 
business closures as unconstitutional or 
as exceeding the State’s police power, 
and those challenges were met with 
varying degrees of success. 
Introduction 
In December of 2019, Wuhan, China, reported a “cluster of novel 
human pneumonia cases,” in which patients experienced fever, dry 
cough, and shortness of breath.1 The press initially termed the 
phenomenon “Wuhan pneumonia” due to the area of origin and the 
 
 1. Yen-Chin Liu et al., COVID-19: The First Documented Coronavirus Pandemic in History, 43 
BIOMED. J. 328, 328 (2020). 
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symptomology of the disease, but whole-genome sequencing 
revealed the “causative agent” behind these symptoms was actually a 
novel coronavirus.2 Sometimes able to jump from animals to humans, 
coronaviruses include “a large family of viruses that usually cause 
mild to moderate upper-respiratory tract illnesses, like the common 
cold.”3 Officially designated COVID-19 by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) in February 2020, the virus swept through 
Asian and European countries—quickly spreading worldwide and 
ultimately reaching the United States in January 2020.4 On March 11, 
2020, the WHO declared COVID-19 a “pandemic”—the first one 
ever to be caused by a coronavirus.5 
Background 
First Wave of Closures 
After COVID-19 cases were reported in Georgia in early March, 
Governor Brian Kemp (R) declared a Public Health State of 
Emergency on March 14, 2020.6 This declaration made various 
 
 2. Id. (“[T]his virus is the seventh member of the coronavirus family to infect humans.”). 
 3. Overview of Coronaviruses, NAT’L INST. ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, 
https://www.niaid.nih.gov/diseases-conditions/coronaviruses [https://perma.cc/AZS5-GF8X] (May 19, 
2020) (“There are hundreds of coronaviruses, most of which circulate among such animals as pigs, 
camels, bats[,] and cats. Sometimes those viruses jump to humans—called a spillover event—and can 
cause disease.”). 
 4. Liu et al., supra note 1 (“Since COVID-19 initially emerged in China, the virus has evolved for 
four months and rapidly spread to other countries worldwide as a global threat.”); see also Derrick 
Bryson Taylor, How the Coronavirus Pandemic Unfolded: A Timeline, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html [https://perma.cc/7J2E-DMCG] (“The first 
confirmed case in the United States came [on January 21, 2020] in Washington State, where a man in 
his [thirties] developed symptoms after returning from a trip to Wuhan.”). 
 5. WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19, WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/director-
general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---
11-march-2020 [https://perma.cc/TNW6-P5SB]. 
 6. Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.14.20.01 (Mar. 14, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University Law 
Review). Subsection (6) of Code section 38-3-3 defines “Public Health Emergency” as: 
[T]he occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition that is 
reasonably believed to be caused by bioterrorism or the appearance of a novel or 
previously controlled or eradicated infectious agent . . . and poses a high probability 
of . . . a large number of deaths in the affected population . . . or . . . substantial future 
harm to a large number of people in the affected population. 
O.C.G.A. § 38-3-3(6) (2012 & Supp. 2019); see also Memorandum from Georgia Gov.’s Office on Pub. 
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“legal and operational resources available to respond to an 
emergency” and gave the governor a wide range of powers.7 Under 
Code section 38-3-51, these powers include the ability “[t]o seize, 
take for temporary use, or condemn property for the protection of the 
public” and “[t]o perform and exercise such other functions, powers, 
and duties as may be deemed necessary to promote and secure the 
safety and protection of the civilian population.”8 Pursuant to these 
powers, Governor Kemp issued the first wave of Executive Orders 
closing schools and businesses in mid-to-late March. 
Executive Order 03.16.20.01 shuttered all public elementary, 
secondary, and post-secondary schools from March 18, 2020, until 
March 31, 2020.9 Justified as a “necessary and appropriate action to 
protect the health, safety, and welfare of Georgia’s residents and 
visitors to help control the spread of COVID-19 throughout [the] 
state,” issuance of this Order drew on powers given to the Governor 
by subsection (d)(1) of Code section 38-3-51.10 
Issued on March 23, 2020, Executive Order 03.23.20.01 closed all 
bars and nightclubs for fourteen days pursuant to the Governor’s 
power “to perform and exercise such other functions, powers, and 
duties as may be deemed necessary to promote and secure the safety 
and protection of the civilian population.”11 The Order also mandated 
that businesses and other establishments could not allow more than 
ten people in a single location unless people could remain six feet 
 
Health State of Emergency to Members of the Georgia Gen. Assemb. (Mar. 15, 2020) (on file with the 
Georgia State University Law Review) [hereinafter Public Health Memorandum]. 
 7. Emergency Declarations and Authorities Fact Sheet of Emergency Authority and Immunity 




 8. O.C.G.A. § 38-3-51 (2012 & Supp. 2020); see also Public Health Memorandum, supra note 6. 
 9. Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.16.20.01, at 2 (Mar. 16, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University 
Law Review). 
 10. Id. at 1; § 38-3-51(d)(1). Subsection (d)(1) of Code section 38-3-51 vests the Governor with the 
emergency power to “[s]uspend any regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of state 
business or the orders, rules, or regulations of any state agency,” provided that “strict compliance with 
any statute, order, rule, or regulation would in any way prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in 
coping with the emergency or disaster.” § 38-3-51(d)(1); see also Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.16.20.01, 
supra note 9, at 1. 
 11. Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.23.20.01, at 1–3 (Mar. 23, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State 
University Law Review). 
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apart at all times.12 Lastly, this Order vested the power to close 
non-compliant businesses and other establishments in the Georgia 
Department of Public Health (DPH) and also provided that the 
Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety would allocate 
additional resources to aid in the enforcement of the Order.13 
On March 26, 2020, Governor Kemp issued Executive Order 
03.26.20.02, which extended Executive Order 03.16.20.01 and closed 
all public elementary, secondary, and post-secondary schools until 
April 24, 2020, to stop the spread of COVID-19.14 
Second Wave of Closures 
As more information became available about the severity of the 
virus, April saw a trend of stricter, more aggressive executive orders 
coming from the Governor’s Office. Issued on April 1, 2020, 
Executive Order 04.01.20.01 extended all school closures mandated 
by Executive Order 03.26.20.02 through the end of the 2019–20 
academic year.15 
One day later, the Governor’s Office issued Executive Order 
04.02.20.01, the most comprehensive Order, instructing “residents to 
shelter in place unless they [were] conducting ‘essential services,’ 
either traveling to and from jobs[,] or taking part in other 
exceptions.”16 As defined by the Order, “essential services” included 
obtaining necessary supplies and services (such as food, medication, 
or equipment to work from home), seeking medical care or 
emergency services, and engaging in outdoor exercise activities so 
long as participants maintained at least six feet of distance between 
each person.17 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 2–3. 
 14. Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.26.20.02, at 2 (Mar. 26, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University 
Law Review). 
 15. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.01.20.01, at 2 (Apr. 1, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University 
Law Review). 
 16. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, at 2–3 (Apr. 2, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State 
University Law Review); see also Greg Bluestein, Kemp Details Georgia’s Statewide Shelter in Place 
Order, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/kemp-details-georgia-
shelter-place-order/hc3ETUjzBedtWW1LoJHTIP/ [https://perma.cc/YM8P-RVVU]. 
 17. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16, at 3. 
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Certain businesses were treated differently than others under the 
Order. For example, the Order mandated that all gyms, fitness 
centers, bowling alleys, theaters, live performance venues, 
amusement parks, tattoo parlors, hair salons, massage parlors, bars, 
and nightclubs “cease in-person operations” entirely and remain 
“close[d] to the public” throughout the duration of the Order.18 
Restaurants and private social clubs could remain open, but they 
were forced to cease dine-in services in lieu of takeout, curbside 
pick-up, or delivery services.19 
Businesses and other similar establishments engaging in 
“minimum basic operations” could continue to operate but were 
limited to a capacity of ten people unless all employees could 
maintain a distance of six feet.20 Further, these businesses had to 
comply with a set of prescribed guidelines, such as providing 
disinfectants for workers, screening workers for COVID-19 
symptoms, and providing personal protective equipment as available 
and appropriate.21 
The Order contained an exception for businesses or entities 
defined as “critical infrastructure” by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security.22 Businesses deemed “critical” could continue 
in-person operations, as long as they implemented measures to 
“mitigate the exposure and spread of COVID-19” among the 
workforce.23 Unlike the specific set of provisions mandated for 
businesses engaging in minimum basic operations, critical businesses 
were encouraged—but not forced—to implement the safety measures 
described in the Order.24 Shortly after Executive Order 04.02.20.01 
 
 18. Id. at 6–7. 
 19. Id. at 6. 
 20. Id. at 4–5. Under the Order, minimum basic operations were limited to the “minimum necessary 
activities to maintain the value of a business, establishment, corporation, non-profit corporation, or 
organization, provide services, manage inventory, ensure security, process payroll and employee 
benefits, or for related functions.” Id. at 3. 
 21. Id. at 4–5; see also Bluestein, supra note 16. 
 22. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16, at 5. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. Such safety measures could include screening workers for symptoms of COVID-19, requiring 
workers with COVID-19 symptoms to stay at home, providing sanitation, requiring hand washing, 
providing personal protective equipment, and implementing staggered shifts for all possible workers—
just to name a few. Id. at 5–6. 
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was issued, the Governor issued Executive Order 04.08.20.04, which 
suspended all short-term vacation rentals until May 1, 2020.25 
Reopening Phase 
On April 23, 2020, Governor Kemp attracted national attention 
when he issued Executive Order 04.23.20.02, which reopened some 
businesses and ended the strict shelter in place.26 The Order first 
urged citizens to vigilantly observe public health precautions, 
directing all people to wear face coverings and engage in social 
distancing.27 It also ordered elderly and immunocompromised people 
to continue sheltering in place within their homes.28 The Order 
prohibited businesses from allowing more than ten people at a single 
location if, to be present, people were required to stand or be seated 
within six feet of any other person.29 
The Order allowed dine-in restaurants to reopen in a very limited 
capacity, restricting them to no more than ten patrons within 500 
square feet of public space.30 Additionally, dine-in restaurants were 
required to follow a list of thirty-nine precautions listed in the 
Order.31 The Order also allowed non-essential businesses, gyms and 
fitness centers, salon and body art studios, indoor movie theaters, and 
bowling alleys to reopen as long as they followed a list of specified 
precautions.32 Not all businesses were permitted to reopen, however; 
 
 25. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.08.20.04, at 1 (Apr. 8, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University 
Law Review). 
 26. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02, at 2 (Apr. 23, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University 
Law Review); Amanda Mall, Georgia’s Experiment in Human Sacrifice, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 29, 
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/04/why-georgia-reopening-coronavirus-
pandemic/610882/ [https://perma.cc/GC2P-UD9U]. This Executive Order provided clear definitions of 
many COVID-19 terms, including gathering, social distancing, and essential services. Ga. Exec. Order 
No. 04.23.20.02, supra, at 3–4. 
 27. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02, supra note 26. 
 28. Id. at 4–5. 
 29. Id. at 11. 
 30. Id. at 7–8. “Public space” included waiting and bar areas, but does not include hallways, 
restrooms, and spaces closed to patrons. Id. at 7. 
 31. Id. at 7–9. 
 32. Id. at 11, 14–15. 
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the Order mandated public swimming pools and amusement parks 
remain closed until May 13, 2020.33 
Over the next few weeks, Governor Kemp released several 
Executive Orders to provide additional guidance to businesses that 
were reopening.34 On June 1, 2020, bars and nightclubs were 
permitted to reopen if they implemented thirty-nine mandatory 
measures.35 Even with the wave of business openings, live 
performance venues remained closed based on the reasoning that it 
was in the best interest of public health.36 As COVID-19 restrictions 
eased, restaurant owners remained uncertain whether customers 
would feel comfortable sitting two feet from the table next to them or 
whether they would want to remain six feet apart.37 
Analysis 
Are These Forced Business Closures Constitutional? 
Other state governors who issued similar Executive Orders 
shuttering businesses in response to COVID-19 experienced legal 
backlash from business owners.38 Specifically, three common 
constitutional challenges to similar state Executive Orders emerged 
from business owners. First, business owners argued that forced 
business closures exceeded the state’s police power.39 Second, 
 
 33. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02, supra note 26, at 12. 
 34. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.27.20.01 (Apr. 27, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University Law 
Review); Ga. Exec. Order No. 05.12.20.02 (May 12, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University 
Law Review); Ga. Exec. Order No. 05.21.20.01 (May 21, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State 
University Law Review); Ga. Exec. Order No. 05.28.20.02 (May 28, 2020) (on file with the Georgia 
State University Law Review); Ga. Exec. Order No. 06.11.20.01 (June 11, 2020) (on file with the 
Georgia State University Law Review). 
 35. Ga. Exec. Order No. 05.28.20.02, supra note 34, at 7–10. 
 36. Georgia Gov. Kemp Renews State of Emergency; Rolls out Opening Dates for More Businesses, 
FOX 5 ATLANTA (May 28, 2020), https://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/georgia-gov-kemp-renews-state-
of-emergency-rolls-out-opening-dates-for-more-businesses [https://perma.cc/VYP3-35Z8]. Governor 
Kemp reasoned, “I know these closures are tough on business owners and their employees, but we will 
continue to watch the data to ensure the health and safety of our citizens.” Id. 
 37. Telephone Interview with Jarrett Stieber, Owner, Little Bear Food & Merch. (June 20, 2020) (on 
file with the Georgia State University Law Review). 
 38. See, e.g., Complaint, Tesla, Inc. v. Alameda Cnty., 20-cv-3186, 2020 WL 2356208 (N.D. Cal. 
May 9, 2020); Friends of DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 873 (Pa. 2020). 
 39. Elizabeth Joh, Yes, States and Local Governments Can Close Private Businesses and Restrict 
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business owners argued that these Executive Orders violated their 
substantive and procedural due process rights under Fourteenth 
Amendment.40 Lastly, some business owners argued that shuttering 
businesses constituted an impermissible “taking” under the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, incorporated against the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.41 The following Sections 
analyze these various claims in the COVID-19 context. 
The Police Power 
States have broad authority to mandate business closures during a 
pandemic through their police power.42 The police power is 
incredibly broad and sweeping, and it is an inherent attribute of state 
sovereignty.43 The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
affirms states’ police power “as a reminder that the national 
government is one of limited authority and that those powers that the 
people did not give to the federal government remain with the states 
and the people.”44 The term “police power” first appeared in Brown 
v. Maryland, a case addressing the constitutionality of a Maryland 
 
Your Movement, POLITICO (Mar. 18, 2020, 6:16 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/18/states-police-power-coronavirus-135826 
[https://perma.cc/8LEH-GLX3]. 
 40. Joshua T. Lewis, Constitutional Challenges to Government COVID-19 Measures Mount, FROST 
BROWN TODD (Apr. 10, 2020), https://frostbrowntodd.com/constitutional-challenges-to-government-
covid-19-measures-mount/ [https://perma.cc/478P-ZCPE]; Mark D. Taticchi et al., Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court Upholds Business-Closure Order, Rules that COVID-19 Is a ‘Natural Disaster,’ 
FAEGRE DRINKER (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://www.faegredrinker.com/en/insights/publications/2020/4/pennsylvania-supreme-court-upholds-
business-closure-order [https://perma.cc/2FF4-6LLP]. 
 41. David Jacobs, Federal Judge Upholds Louisiana Bar Restrictions, WASH. EXAM’R. (Aug. 18, 
2020, 3:00 PM), https://washingtonexaminer.com/politics/federal-judge-upholds-louisiana-bar-
restrictions [https://perma.cc/55C8-YES5]. 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. X; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 78 (1824). 
 43. U.S. CONST. amend. X; Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 78; see also Brian W. Ohm, Some Modern Day 
Musings on the Police Power, 47 URB. LAW. 625, 626 (2015); Santiago Legarre, The Historical 
Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 781–96 (2017) (“Nowadays, insofar as the 
expression is used in American constitutional law, the phrase ‘police power’ normally refers to the 
authority of the states for the promotion of public health, public safety, public morals, and public 
welfare.”). 
 44. U.S. CONST. amend. X; Ohm, supra note 43. The Tenth Amendment simply states, “[t]he powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
8
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regulation that required importers of foreign goods to obtain a license 
to do so.45 In Brown, Chief Justice John Marshall first referenced the 
police power when he stated, “[t]he power to direct removal of 
gunpowder is a branch of the police power, which unquestionably 
remains, and ought to remain, with the States.”46 In Gibbons v. 
Ogden, Chief Justice John Marshall further detailed the leviathan 
nature of police power: 
They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation, 
which embraces every thing within the territory of a State, 
not surrendered to the general government: all which can 
be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves. 
Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every 
description, as well as laws for regulating the internal 
commerce of a State, and those which respect turnpike 
roads, ferries, &c.[,] are component parts of this mass.47 
Nearly a century later, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme 
Court held states may use the police power to enact quarantine laws 
and “health laws of every description,” so long as the laws are 
reasonable and protect public health and public safety.48 In other 
words, states may restrict civil liberties to limit the spread of a 
communicable disease as long as the state actions have a reasonable 
relationship to public health.49 Courts adopt a very deferential 
 
 45. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 443 (1827), abrogated by Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson 
Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995); D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 471, 474 (2004). 
 46. Brown, 25 U.S. at 443; Barros, supra note 45. 
 47. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 78. In Gibbons, the Court found New York ultimately lacked the power to 
restrict navigation under the Commerce Clause, though it was within its police power. Id.; see also, e.g., 
State v. McKay, 193 S.W. 99, 100 (Tenn. 1917) (holding Tennessee law requiring labeling of seed 
packets was “an attempted exercise by the state of the police power, which was one of the powers 
reserved to the states in the national Constitution”); Legarre, supra note 43, at 792–93 (“[W]hen the 
courts today . . . make reference to the acknowledged ends of the police power (‘public health, safety, 
morals, welfare’) they do so . . . to provide non-exhaustive examples of the goods that the police power 
may promote.”). Theoretically, a state could limit its police power by proscribing such legislation in its 
own constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 48. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1905). 
 49. Id.; Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed: Yes, Businesses Have Been Hurt by Coronavirus Closures, but 
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standard of review regarding state actions taken during a public 
health emergency and will likely find state actions bear a reasonable 
relationship to public health as long as they are not completely 
arbitrary.50 At first glance, Jacobson may not seem relevant to forced 
business closures in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic—it was an 
early twentieth-century case that analyzed whether the Massachusetts 
state government could mandate smallpox vaccinations.51 Because it 
is one of the few cases analyzing the police power as applied to 
communicable disease, however, it has become a seminal case to 
analyze forced business closures in the wake of COVID-19.52 
States’ use of the police power to close certain businesses during 
public health emergencies may be limited by the First and Second 
Amendments.53 In a 6–3 decision, the Supreme Court denied a 
church’s request for injunctive relief pending appeal in Calvary 
Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak after the State of Nevada ordered 
houses of worship to limit services to no more than fifty persons to 
combat the spread of COVID-19.54 At the same time, Nevada 
allowed secular gatherings, such as casinos, to operate at 50% 
capacity, which in many cases exceeded the fifty-person limit 
imposed on houses of worship.55 Justice Alito dissented from the 
Court’s denial of injunctive relief, concluding that Nevada’s actions 
constituted discrimination under the First Amendment; Justice Alito 
also discouraged lower courts from blindly applying Jacobson 
precedent during the COVID-19 pandemic: “It is a considerable 
stretch to read [Jacobson] as establishing the test to be applied when 
statewide measures of indefinite duration are challenged under the 
First Amendment or other provisions not at issue in that case.”56 
 
coronavirus-closures-but-they-wont-get-relief-from-the-courts [https://perma.cc/UZ9Y-G3CV]. 
 50. Jorge E. Galva et al., Public Health Strategy and the Police Powers of the State, 120 PUB. 
HEALTH REPS. 20, 21 (2005). 
 51. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24–25. 
 52. Id.; Chemerinsky, supra note 49 (“The Supreme Court has held [in Jacobson] that restrictions of 
civil liberties are allowed to limit the spread of a communicable disease, so long as there is a real and 
substantial relationship to public health. This is why quarantine orders are constitutional, even though 
they greatly restrict freedom.”). 
 53. Telephone Interview with Eric Segall, Ashe Family Chair Professor of L., Ga. State Univ. Coll. 
of L. (June 19, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University Law Review). 
 54. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2603 (2020). 
 55. Id. at 2603–06 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 56. Id. at 2603, 2606. 
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Further, it is possible that the Second Amendment precludes states 
from using the police power to close firearm retailers and shooting 
ranges during the COVID-19 pandemic. In Altman v. County of Santa 
Clara, however, the Northern District of California held that a county 
Order mandating closures of all businesses, including firearm 
retailers and shooting ranges, was constitutional because it was 
facially neutral and treated all businesses alike.57 However, it is 
possible that a court could find closures of firearm retailers and 
shooting ranges unconstitutional if those businesses were treated 
differently from other businesses, as Justice Alito noted in his dissent 
in Calvary Chapel, stating that Nevada’s restrictions discriminated 
against houses of worship.58 
Here, Georgia officials acted within the state’s police power to 
force businesses to close during the COVID-19 pandemic because its 
actions were in the interest of public health.59 In Gibbons, the 
Supreme Court explicitly stated that quarantine laws and health laws 
are permissible uses of a state’s police power.60 Georgia’s forced 
business closures were rooted in serious public health concerns, as 
evinced by Governor Brian Kemp’s (R) Executive Orders, which not 
only closed businesses but also ordered elderly and 
immunocompromised people to shelter in place within their homes.61 
In fact, the sole purpose of the forced business closures was to 
prevent the spread of COVID-19 and to protect the “health, safety, 
and welfare of Georgia’s residents and visitors.”62 Even though 
 
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. II; Altman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, No. 20-cv-2180, 2020 WL 2850291, at 
*1, *12 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2020). 
 58. Compare Altman, 2020 WL 2850291, at *1, *12, with Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2603–06 
(Alito, J., dissenting). 
 59. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12–13 (1905); Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.16.20.01, 
supra note 9, at 1 (“Further action is necessary to protect the health and safety of the population of 
Georgia, slow the spread of COVID-19, reduce the number of people who will become infected, and 
avoid unnecessary strain on Georgia’s healthcare system . . . .”); see also David French, The Police 
Power of the States to Control a Pandemic, Explained, THE DISPATCH (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://thedispatch.com/p/the-police-power-of-the-states-to [https://perma.cc/9JSK-J7J4]; Damon Root, 
Police Powers During a Pandemic: Constitutional, but Not Unlimited, REASON (Mar. 18, 2020, 12:00 
PM), https://reason.com/2020/03/18/police-powers-during-a-pandemic-constitutional-but-not-unlimited/ 
[https://perma.cc/E2AH-M8CM] (proposing a framework to analyze whether public health laws are 
within a state’s police power). 
 60. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 78 (1824). 
 61. See, e.g., Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16, at 2, 6–7. 
 62. Id. at 2. 
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Georgia’s forced business closures did not directly govern health 
issues like the Massachusetts law requiring smallpox vaccinations in 
Jacobson, they were nonetheless related to public health because they 
were enacted for the purpose of stemming the unchecked spread of 
COVID-19.63 
Further, Georgia’s forced business closures were a constitutional 
exercise of the state police power because they did not violate 
individual liberties protected by the First and Second Amendments. 
Georgia’s Executive Orders mandating business closures did not 
implicate First Amendment issues because they did not treat houses 
of worship differently from secular businesses.64 Unlike Nevada’s 
Executive Order detailed in Calvary Chapel, which limited houses of 
worship to fifty attendees but allowed hundreds of patrons to enter 
casinos at the same time, Georgia’s Executive Orders imposed no 
restrictions on houses of worship that were not also imposed on 
secular businesses.65 Georgia’s forced business closures did not 
violate the Second Amendment because the Executive Orders 
explicitly did not apply to the operation of stores selling firearms and 
ammunition.66 Georgia’s forced business closures were more 
deferential to citizens’ Second Amendment rights than the business 
closures at issue in Altman because Georgia allowed firearms and 
ammunition retailers and transporters to remain open during the 
COVID-19 pandemic.67 Finally, Georgia’s use of the police power to 
close businesses in the context of a pandemic was not prohibited by 
the Georgia Constitution or laws enacted by the state legislature.68 
 
 63. Id.; Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12–13. 
 64. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16. 
 65. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2603 (2020); Ga. Exec. Order No. 
04.02.20.01, supra note 16; see also Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.16.20.01, supra note 9. 
 66. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16, at 9. 
 67. Id.; Altman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, No. 20-cv-2180, 2020 WL 2850291, at *1, *12 (N.D. Cal. 
June 2, 2020). 
 68. See O.C.G.A. § 38-3-51(d)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2020); GA. CONST. art. I, § III, para. 1(a). 
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Fourteenth Amendment Challenges to Forced Business Closures 
The Fourteenth Amendment provided two main avenues for 
business owners to challenge forced business closures.69 First, 
business owners argued that the forced business closures violated 
their substantive and procedural due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Second, business owners argued that the 
forced business closures constituted a “taking” requiring payment of 
just compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
which was incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. However, both claims face significant uphill battles—
for “[e]ven in usual times, judicial deference to the government’s 
ability to regulate the economy is enormous, and it will be even 
greater in the context of a pandemic.”70 
Forced Business Closures as Violations of Due Process Rights 
Both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States contain a Due Process Clause.71 The Fifth 
Amendment prohibits the federal government from depriving people 
“of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”72 Likewise, 
the Fourteenth Amendment repeats this language—extending its 
applicability to states and thus barring them from these same 
categories of deprivations.73 Despite the vague language, these 
constitutional provisions carry special importance: they “impose 
constraints on governmental actions or decisions which deprive 
persons of interests.”74 In defining the scope of these constraints, the 
Supreme Court has established that neither the federal nor state 
governments may interfere with life, liberty, or property by taking 
legislative actions that are considered “arbitrary or without 
 
 69. Friends of DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 873 (Pa. 2020). 
 70. Chemerinsky, supra note 49. 
 71. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § I. 
 72. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 73. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 74. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1883 (2020). 
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reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the 
state to effect.”75 
State constitutions often contain similar limitations on 
governmental powers, and Georgia’s Constitution is no exception.76 
Specifically, Article I, Section I of the Georgia Constitution provides: 
“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property except by 
due process of law.”77 Similarly, the “individual interests” protected 
by the Due Process Clause are life, liberty, and property.78 
Substantive due process protects certain categories of liberty interests 
from government infringement “no matter what process is provided, 
unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest.”79 On the other hand, procedural due process 
scrutinizes the constitutionality of procedures used to deny a person’s 
life, liberty, or property.80 
If a fundamental right or a protected class is not involved in the 
litigation, courts apply a rational basis test to determine whether a 
governmental action violated a plaintiff’s substantive due process 
rights.81 Under this standard, courts do not require that the 
government’s action be “the best, or even the least intrusive, means 
available to achieve its objective.”82 In fact, the means adopted by the 
action do not violate due process so long as they bear a “rational 
relationship to a legitimate [objective] of the government.”83 
Therefore, only arbitrary or irrelevant actions offend notions of due 
process under the rational basis test.84 
 
 75. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). 
 76. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 1; Policy Guide on the Takings, Substantive Due Process, and 
Regulatory Takings Doctrines, AM. PLAN. ASS’N: MICHIGAN CHAPTER, 
https://www.planningmi.org/assets/docs/Policies/MAP%20Takings%20Substantive%20Due%20Process
%20and%20Regulatory%20Takings%20Background.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW8U-THUJ]. 
 77. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 1. 
 78. U.S. CONST. amend. V; 16 C.J.S., supra note 74. 
 79. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). 
 80. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). 
 81. Old S. Duck Tours v. Mayor & Alderman of Savannah, 272 Ga. 869, 872, 535 S.E.2d 751, 754 
(2000). 
 82. City of Lilburn v. Sanchez, 268 Ga. 520, 522, 491 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1997). 
 83. Georgia Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Sweat, 276 Ga. 627, 630, 580 S.E.2d 206, 211 (2003). 
 84. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking down an amendment to the Colorado 
Constitution that prohibited gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals from bringing claims of 
discrimination based on their sexual orientation as violating the Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause under rational basis review, reasoning that laws premised on animus toward 
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Amid the pandemic, business owners brought lawsuits challenging 
the constitutional validity of forced business closures, arguing that 
the mandatory closure of all non-essential business violated their 
right to “engage in the common occupations of life” and the right to 
pursue their “chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental 
interference.”85 Because forced business closures have not been held 
to implicate a fundamental right, courts have employed rational basis 
review to evaluate the constitutionality of the business closures.86 
Although government actions subject to rational basis review 
generally survive constitutional scrutiny, one district court in 
Pennsylvania recently struck down the State’s forced business 
closures as “so arbitrary in its creation, scope, and administration as 
to fail constitutional scrutiny.”87 The court in County of Butler v. 
Wolf conducted a fact-specific inquiry into the extent to which the 
Governor of Pennsylvania crafted an Executive Order that closed 
businesses arbitrarily.88 In finding that the Governor of Pennsylvania 
acted arbitrarily, the court considered, among other factors, the lack 
of a formal definition of what constituted “non-life-sustaining” 
businesses, the overlap of products and services sold between 
“life-sustaining” and “non-life-sustaining” businesses, and the State’s 
eventual closure of the waiver application process due to a wavier 
requests backlog.89 
Whether Governor Kemp’s forced business closures violated the 
due process rights of business owners would likely be subject to the 
same fact-intensive judicial scrutiny employed in Wolf.90 In support 
of the State’s position that Governor Kemp’s Executive Order 
closing nonessential businesses bears a “rational relationship” to the 
 
historically-oppressed classes may indicate a lack of rational relationship); see also Old S. Duck Tours, 
272 Ga. at 872, 535 S.E.2d at 754–55 (providing legal standard for rational basis review in Georgia). 
 85. Cnty. of Butler v. Wolf, No. 20-CV-677, 2020 WL 5510690, at *25 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2020). 
 86. Id. (evaluating the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s forced business closures during the 
COVID-19 pandemic and striking down the Executive Orders as violating Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses). 
 87. Id. at *26 (“Even with this forgiving standard as its guide, the Court nevertheless holds that the 
March 19, 2020 Order closing all ‘non-life-sustaining’ businesses was so arbitrary in its creation, 
scope[,] and administration as to fail constitutional scrutiny.”). 
 88. Id. at *26–27. 
 89. Id. at *27–29. 
 90. Id.; Old S. Duck Tours v. Mayor & Alderman of Savannah, 272 Ga. 869, 872, 535 S.E.2d 751, 
754 (2000). 
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state’s objective of limiting and controlling the spread of COVID-19, 
Governor Kemp would justify the closures as “necessary and 
appropriate action[s] to protect the health, safety, and welfare of 
Georgia’s residents and visitors to help control the spread of 
COVID-19 throughout [the] state.”91 Further supporting the 
Governor’s position would be that the actions taken fell “within the 
scope of the police power.”92 However, the court’s decision in Wolf 
introduces uncertainty into how a federal court in Georgia might 
resolve the same constitutional questions posed by business owners 
challenging the closure of their businesses. Though courts tend to be 
“very deferential” to the state when confronted with violations of due 
process claims, whether forced Georgia business closures would pass 
constitutional muster under the Due Process Clause remains 
uncertain.93 
Takings Claims Under the Fourteenth Amendment 
Another frequent constitutional challenge against forced business 
closures in other states was that these state-mandated closures 
violated business owners’ rights under the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, which was incorporated against the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment.94 In addition to protecting people from 
infringement of due process rights, the Fifth Amendment prohibits 
the federal government from taking private property for public use 
“without just compensation.”95 Similarly, the Georgia Constitution 
also provides that the State of Georgia cannot take or damage private 
property for public use without adequate and just compensation.96 In 
assessing a takings claim, Georgia courts balance the State’s interest 
in regulation against a property owner’s interest in unfettered use of 
 
 91. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16; see also Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.16.20.01, 
supra note 9, at 1. 
 92. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Marysville, 279 U.S. 582, 584 (1929). 
 93. Chemerinsky, supra note 49. 
 94. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV; see also Richard Frank, Do Epidemic-Based Business Closures by 
Government Trigger an Unconstitutional “Taking”?, LEGAL PLANET (May 7, 2020), https://legal-
planet.org/2020/05/07/do-epidemic-based-business-closures-by-government-trigger-an-unconstitutional-
taking/ [https://perma.cc/4UA2-DALM]. 
 95. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 96. GA. CONST. art. I, § III, para. 1(a). 
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property to determine the propriety of using police power to 
regulate.97 
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court held that a 
government action depriving a landowner of “all economically 
beneficial or productive use of the land” was a public taking 
requiring just compensation.98 In Lucas, a man bought beachfront 
properties with the intent to develop them, but before he could, the 
state legislature enacted a statute barring him from erecting any 
permanent habitable structures on the land.99 The Court explained 
that two types of takings can occur: one that encompasses 
“regulations that compel the property owner to suffer a physical 
‘invasion’ of his property” and a second situation “where regulation 
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of the land.”100 
In regards to permanent physical invasions, the Court has 
explained that “no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter 
how weighty the public purpose behind it,” governmental intrusion 
upon another’s land requires just compensation.101 For example, in 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Supreme Court 
held that a cable installation on a building constituted a “taking” 
because it involved a permanent “physical attachment of plates, 
boxes, wires, bolts, and screws to the building.”102 Importantly, 
however, this type of taking must constitute “an actual physical 
invasion” of the property.103 The Court has also acknowledged a 
second type of taking in which a government regulation imposes 
restrictions that deprive property owners of the beneficial use of their 
property.104 Such “confiscatory regulations” include government 
mandates that prevent property owners from using their land in an 
economically beneficial manner.105 Because the forced business 
 
 97. Pope v. City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 331, 333–35, 249 S.E.2d 16, 18–20 (1978). 
 98. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–19 (1992). 
 99. Id. at 1006–07. 
 100. Id. at 1015. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982). 
 103. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979). 
 104. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (“[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation 
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 
(1922))). 
 105. Id. at 1029 (defining confiscatory regulations as “regulations that prohibit all economically 
 
17
Culverhouse and Martin: FORCED BUSINESS CLOSURES: Executive Orders by the Governor Closin
Published by Reading Room,
128 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1 
closures arose from the regulations imposed by Governor Kemp 
rather than from any forced physical appropriation of actual property, 
the Executive Orders are best analyzed under the regulatory takings 
framework.106 
Unlike physical takings, the concept of regulatory takings is not 
explicitly defined within the four corners of the Constitution.107 
Rather, courts have recognized that regulatory takings jurisprudence 
has traditionally been “characterized by ‘essentially ad hoc, factual 
inquiries,’ designed to allow ‘careful examination and weighing of all 
the relevant circumstances.’”108 Courts have grappled with whether 
all regulations that effectively deny property owners of economically 
beneficial uses of their land should constitute a compensable taking, 
recognizing that some government intrusions into property rights 
may be necessary to “adjust[] the benefits and burdens of economic 
life to promote the common good.”109 As such, courts have declined 
to adopt a categorical rule requiring governmental agencies to 
compensate landowners for deprivations of economic use of land 
resulting from government regulations.110 Thus, challengers “face an 
uphill battle” when contesting government regulations that affect the 
use of their property.111 
Despite the lack of a categorical rule, courts have recognized that 
property owners are still entitled to compensation when a regulation 
 
beneficial use of land”). 
 106. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 n.17 (2002) 
(observing that a regulatory takings challenge “contends a taking has occurred because a law or 
regulation imposes restrictions so severe that they are tantamount to a condemnation or appropriation”); 
Elizabeth Wolstein, Do State Shut-Down Orders Effect a Taking for Which the State Must Pay Just 
Compensation?, N.Y. L. J. (Apr. 22, 2020, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/04/22/do-state-shut-down-orders-effect-a-taking-for-
which-the-state-must-pay-just-compensation/ [https://perma.cc/69XC-PJKY]. 
 107. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 321. 
 108. Id. at 332 (first quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); 
then quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001)). 
 109. Id. at 324–25 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124). Courts have accepted extensive policy 
arguments against finding that all regulatory prohibitions on land use constitute a compensable taking, 
primarily acknowledging the effect such a rule would have on the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
operation of local governments. Id. at 335 (“A rule that required compensation for every delay in the use 
of property would render routine government processes prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty 
decision[-]making.”). 
 110. Id. at 342. 
 111. Id. at 320 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 
(1987)). 
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results in a “total taking” of the property.112 In Lucas, the Court 
established that a total taking occurs when a regulation imposes a 
permanent prohibition of the intended use of a property, thus 
depriving the owner of “all economically beneficial” value of the 
property.113 Subsequent cases have clarified, however, that Lucas 
stands to apply only in the ‘“extraordinary’ case in which a 
regulation permanently deprives property of all value.”114 The Court 
in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency declined to extend Lucas to cover temporary 
prohibitions on particular uses of land.115 In Tahoe-Sierra, members 
of a nonprofit development group and individual owners of vacant 
lots located in the Lake Tahoe basin challenged a thirty-two-month 
moratorium and an eight-month moratorium on development of 
property located within a portion of the basin.116 The Court 
distinguished Lucas because the moratoria only temporarily deprived 
the property owners of the originally intended economic use of the 
land, rather than permanently prohibiting development in the area.117 
As a result, the Court held that when a regulation falls short of the 
extraordinary line drawn in Lucas—when the regulation causes only 
a temporary deprivation of the economically beneficial use of the 
property—the Court must embark on a more fact-specific inquiry to 
determine whether a compensable taking has occurred.118 
Under this more fact-intensive inquiry, courts typically consider 
factors such as the cumulative economic impact of the regulation and 
“the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations.”119 Because the analysis requires a 
“careful examination and weighing of all the relevant 
circumstances,” however, courts must also consider how the 
 
 112. Id. at 331. 
 113. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
 114. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322 (emphasis added). 
 115. Id. at 342. 
 116. Id. at 306–12. The record established that the individual lot owners purchased the land prior to 
the imposition of the moratoria and did so with the intent to construct residences on the property. Id. at 
312–13. 
 117. Id. at 330–31. 
 118. Id. at 335. 
 119. Id. at 321–22; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
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challenged regulations promote fairness and justice.120 Additionally, 
courts provide substantial deference to states imposing confiscatory 
restrictions when such regulations serve a substantial public service, 
such as the promotion of the health, safety, and general welfare of the 
community.121 For example, courts typically afford states leeway in 
regulating land use under its “complementary power to abate 
nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.”122 This 
vague “otherwise” includes “litigation absolving the State (or private 
parties) of liability for the destruction of ‘real and personal property, 
in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire’ or to 
forestall other grave threats to the lives and property of others.”123 As 
an illustration, the Court in Miller v. Schoene held that the State of 
Virginia was not required to compensate tree owners when the State 
destroyed privately-owned red cedar trees to stop the spread of a 
cedar rust infection to apple orchards because the Virginia legislature 
provided statutory authority for the State to do so.124 The Court 
reasoned that “where the public interest is involved[,] preferment of 
that interest over the property interest of the individual—to the extent 
even of its destruction—is one of the distinguishing characteristics of 
every exercise of the police power which affects property.”125 
Specifically, the Court determined that the “only practicable method 
of controlling the disease and protecting apple trees from its ravages” 
was the destruction of the red cedar trees.126 
Because Governor Kemp’s Executive Orders forced only 
temporary business closures, the Orders did not leave the property 
owners with a “total loss” of the economically beneficial use of the 
 
 120. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 342 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 33 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)) (“We conclude . . . that the interest in ‘fairness and justice’ will be best 
served by relying on the familiar Penn Central approach when deciding cases like this, rather than by 
attempting to craft a new categorical rule.”). Such policy concerns include whether the regulations affect 
the government’s ability to operate efficiently, whether the regulations promote effective planning to 
protect the interests of the affected parties, and whether the regulations result in individualized harm. Id. 
at 337–42; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125 (citing Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928)). 
 121. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125, 127. 
 122. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
 123. Id. at 1029, n.16 (quoting Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18–19 (1880)). 
 124. Miller, 276 U.S. at 277 (“The Virginia statute presents a comprehensive scheme for the 
condemnation and destruction of red cedar trees infected by cedar rust.”). 
 125. Id. at 280. 
 126. Id. at 279. 
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property and are therefore likely constitutional.127 Unlike the 
permanent physical installation on the building in Loretto or the 
complete disallowance of all future land development in Lucas, 
COVID-19-forced business closures were intended to be 
temporary—only lasting long enough to curb the spread of 
COVID-19.128 The temporary nature of the business closures was 
akin to the moratoria imposed in Tahoe-Sierra, though lasting for 
only a fraction of the time.129 The Executive Orders only forced 
Georgia businesses to close their doors for six weeks before 
reopening again, as opposed to the thirty-two-month moratoria 
imposed in Tahoe-Sierra that still fell short of constituting a 
compensable permanent deprivation of all economic benefit.130 
Though the temporary closures undoubtedly deprived the business 
owners of their intended use for the property, the deprivation of 
economic benefit for six weeks fell far short of constituting a threat 
of “permanent ‘obliteration’ of the value” of the property at issue.131 
Additionally, Governor Kemp’s Orders fell within the State’s 
power to protect the public. Like in Miller, Governor Kemp was 
faced with a decision to either sit idly as COVID-19 continued to 
spread rapidly throughout the state or impose certain executive 
restrictions favoring the public interest over competing private 
business interests, like interests of the cedar tree owners in Miller.132 
Just as the spread of a cedar rust infection amongst cedar and apple 
trees justified a government’s order to destroy privately-owned trees, 
 
 127. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330, 332 
(2002). 
 128. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16, at 2–3; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006–07; 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982). The statutory prohibition 
on development in Lucas was ultimately amended during the litigation to authorize certain exceptions to 
the development restrictions. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012. However, the Court declined to consider the 
State’s argument that the deprivation deserved to be analyzed as only a temporary taking because the 
statute, at the time of the challenge, was “unconditional and permanent.” Id. 
 129. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332; Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16; see also Ga. 
Exec. Order No. 03.16.20.01, supra note 9; Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02, supra note 26. 
 130. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332; Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.16.20.01, supra note 9; Ga. Exec. Order 
No. 03.23.20.01, supra note 11; Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16; Ga. Exec. Order No. 
04.23.20.02, supra note 26; see also Mall, supra note 26. 
 131. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019–20); see also Ga. Exec. Order No. 
03.16.20.01, supra note 9; Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.23.20.01, supra note 11; Ga. Exec. Order No. 
04.02.20.01, supra note 16; Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02, supra note 26. 
 132. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928). 
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the spread of a deadly pandemic justified Governor Kemp’s ordered 
business closures.133 As courts have recognized, prohibitions of 
particular uses of land may be justified where the government 
reasonably concludes that such prohibitions or restrictions promote 
the health, safety, or general welfare of the community.134 Here, the 
Executive Orders even explicitly state that such business closures 
were imposed to mitigate the spread of COVID-19.135 Moreover, the 
Orders reflect an attempt of the Georgia government to impose swift, 
uniform regulations that avoided the risk of individualized harm, 
analogous to the risk to the individual that the Court weighed in favor 
of the state regulation in Tahoe-Sierra.136 Because the COVID-19 
pandemic presented health concerns across the entire State of 
Georgia, it was necessary for Governor Kemp to mandate uniform, 
temporary restrictions to help quell the spread of the deadly virus.137 
Therefore, courts would likely show deference to the temporary 
forced business closures under Takings Clause jurisprudence because 
the closures were ordered to combat the spread of COVID-19.138 
Due to the fact-specific nature of the inquiry into whether a 
temporary land-use regulation constitutes a compensable taking, 
some courts could find specific circumstances more persuasive than 
 
 133. Id.; see also Ilya Somin, Does The Takings Clause Require Compensation for Coronavirus 
Shutdowns?, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 20, 2020, 10:20 PM), 
https://reason.com/2020/03/20/does-the-takings-clause-require-compensation-for-coronavirus-
shutdowns/ [https://perma.cc/WSW2-NL4P]. Professor Ilya Somin referenced Miller when he stated 
why he thought forced business closure lawsuits would not succeed: “Protecting large numbers of 
people from the spread of a disease is, of course, a much stronger police power imperative than 
protecting apple trees.” Id. 
 134. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 103, 125 (1978). 
 135. See, e.g., Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 16, at 1. 
 136. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341 (“Moreover, with a temporary ban on development[,] there is a 
lesser risk that individual landowners will be ‘singled out’ to bear a special burden that should be shared 
by the public as a whole.”). 
 137. Id. at 340 (“Indeed, the interest in protecting the decisional process is even stronger when an 
agency is developing a regional plan than when it is considering a permit for a single parcel.”). Courts 
have recognized that, in the situation where large areas are faced with similar threats, temporary 
land-use restrictions deserve a degree of deference because they allow the government time to perform 
added due diligence to ensure appropriate long-term measures are taken rather than rushing to make an 
uninformed decision. Id. at 340–41 (recognizing that forcing decisionmakers to make hasty decisions 
absent deliberations with interested parties “would only serve to [further] disadvantage those 
landowners and interest groups” challenging the temporary restrictions). 
 138. Chemerinsky, supra note 49. 
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other courts.139 While business owners continued to challenge similar 
regulations across the country, scholars remained pessimistic of the 
ultimate likelihood of success of such challenges.140 Because of the 
latitude afforded to state officials in times of emergency, courts were 
most likely to find that such temporary restrictions did not constitute 
a total deprivation of all economically beneficial use of property and 
that such mandates were, moreover, necessary to promote the health 
and safety of the community.141 
Conclusion 
Due to the state of uncertainty surrounding COVID-19 and the 
large scope of power afforded to federal, state, and local governments 
during a public health emergency, challenges to the constitutionality 
of Governor Brian Kemp’s (R) Executive Orders were likely to fail. 
Legal challenges to the forced business closures could include that 
the forced closures exceeded the scope of the State’s police power, 
violated business owners’ due process rights, or constituted 
impermissible takings requiring the payment of just compensation. 
Even though these forced business closures caused devastating 
effects for business owners across the state of Georgia, preventing 
the spread of COVID-19 likely qualified as a reasonable—and 
constitutional—justification for this economic harm. 
Baylee A. Culverhouse & Alexa R. Martin
 
 139. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335. 
 140. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 94. 
 141. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 342; Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928). 
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